✍️ Sanctions Are Not War. But They’re Not Innocent Either
Why the U.S. uses economic force, when it works, and why it still makes me uneasy

When I first saw headlines about the United States seizing a Russian tanker carrying Venezuelan oil, my reaction was blunt and emotional. It felt like another example of Donald Trump acting unilaterally—strong-arming other countries, pushing boundaries, daring the world to stop him. It sounded less like foreign policy and more like an authoritarian impulse.
And I still worry about that.
But after digging into how sanctions work, I remembered that presidents of both parties—including Joe Biden—have relied on sanctions, particularly after Russia invaded Ukraine.
I also realized something uncomfortable: Sanctions themselves are not automatically reckless or evil. In fact, they’ve become one of the most common tools the U.S. uses instead of war.
That doesn’t make them harmless. It makes them complicated.
What sanctions really are
Sanctions are not international law handed down by some neutral referee. They are U.S. law, enforced beyond U.S. borders through economic power. Presidents impose them through executive orders under statutes passed by Congress—often after declaring a national emergency tied to national security, foreign aggression, or human rights abuses.
Once imposed, sanctions can freeze assets, block transactions, punish companies that do business with targeted countries—and, in some cases, seize ships or cargo if they pass through U.S. jurisdiction.
That last part is what makes headlines—and raises alarms. What unsettles me is how flexible “U.S. jurisdiction” can become—sometimes tied to clear borders and ports, other times to financial systems or personnel far from home.
Why they’re used instead of war
Sanctions function as a “middle ground” between diplomacy and military force. They’re meant to apply pressure without dropping bombs. History shows presidents of both parties have used them that way—against apartheid-era South Africa, Iran’s nuclear program, and Russia after it invaded Ukraine. Other cases—such as Iraq in the 1990s or Cuba over decades—show how sanctions can punish populations without changing regimes.
The appeal is obvious. Sanctions are cheaper than war, easier to scale, and politically safer at home. They signal seriousness without sending troops.
But they’re not bloodless. They can damage civilian economies, entrench authoritarian leaders, and create resentment that lasts longer than the policy itself.
When sanctions start to look like acts of war
This is where my skepticism kicks in.
When sanctions escalate to seizures, blockades, or aggressive enforcement against third parties, they begin to resemble economic warfare. They may not involve bullets, but they can still provoke retaliation, miscalculation, or escalation—especially when imposed by an already dominant power.
That’s why sanctions can feel like a first step toward conflict, even when sold as a way to prevent one.
Economic power cuts both ways—but not equally
Sanctions are not something only the United States uses. Other countries and blocs impose sanctions on the U.S. or its companies from time to time. The European Union has done so. China does so selectively.
But most countries lack the leverage the U.S. has because they don’t control the world’s primary reserve currency or the dominant global financial system.
That imbalance is why U.S. sanctions tend to bite harder—and why they are often viewed as coercive rather than cooperative. It raises a harder question about their purpose.
When sanctions are used primarily to advance U.S. economic interests or protect favored industries, they blur the line between legitimate security policy and economic overreach. The same imbalance appears with tariffs.
Both tools rely on economic pressure, both raise costs, and both often affect ordinary people more than political leaders—sometimes with consequences that last longer than the policy itself.
I explored a similar dynamic in an earlier commentary on tariffs, another economic tool that often carries unintended consequences.
Where this leaves us
I don’t think sanctions should be dismissed outright. Compared to war, they can be a restraint. Used narrowly, transparently, and in coordination with allies, they may slow down aggression or deter worse outcomes.
But they deserve skepticism—especially when imposed by a president who shows little respect for norms, institutions, or consequences.
For citizens, the takeaway isn’t to cheer or condemn reflexively. It’s to stay alert, ask who benefits, who pays, and what comes next. Sanctions are power exercised at a distance. Like all power, they can prevent harm—or create it.
The difference lies not in the tool, but in how—and why—it’s used.
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